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Physician·assisted suicide: the last bridge to
active voluntary euthanasia
YALE KAMISAR

an eminent constitutional law scholar, Charles L.
Black, Jr, spoke of 'toiling uphill against that heaviest of all argumental
weights- the weight of a slogan. ' 1 I am reminded of that observation when I
confront the slogan the 'right to die.'
SOME 30 YEARS AGO

THE 'RIGHT TO DIE'
Few rallying cries or slogans are more appealing and seductive than the 'right
to die.' But few are more fuzzy, more misleading, or more misunderstood.
The phrase has been used loosely by many people to embrace at least four
different rights:
I

2

3
4

the right to reject or to terminate unwanted medical procedures,
including life-saving treatment;
the right to commit suicide or, as some call it, the right to 'rational' suicide;
the right to assisted suicide, that is, the right to obtain another's help in
committing suicide; and
the right to active voluntary euthanasia, that is, the right to authorize
another to kill you intentionally and directly.

Each of these four 'rights' should be kept separate and distinct. Unfortunately,
many times they are not.
First of all, neither the 1976 Quinlan case 2 nor the 1990 Cruzan case 3 (the
only case involving death, dying and the 'right to privacy' ever decided by the
225
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US Supreme Court) establishes an absolute or general right to die- a right to
end one's life in any manner one sees fit. The only right or liberty that the
Quinlan Court established and the Cruzan Court recognized is the right
under certain circumstances to refuse or to reject life-sustaining medical
treatment or, as many have called it, the right to die a natural death.
Indeed, the Quinlan case explicitly distinguished between letting die on the
one hand, and both direct killing and assisted suicide on the other. 4 No less
prominent an advocate of assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia
than the Hemlock Society's Derek Humphry recognizes that the Quinlan case
'is significant,' inter alia, for 'distinguishing between suicide and the passive
withdrawal of life supports.' 5
As did Quinlan, the Cruzan case, the one 'right to die' case that rivals
Quinlan for prominence, involved the right to end artificial life support. 6
Cruzan, too, provides small comfort to proponents of a constitutional right
to assisted suicide.
In Cruzan, a 5-4 majority, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, 'assumed for
purposes of this case' that a competent person has 'a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.' 7 But the Court
declined to call the liberty a 'fundamental right,' a characterization that
requires a state to provide a compelling justification before restricting it.
Instead, the Court called the right 'a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.' 8
By avoiding 'fundamental right' language, the Court, it seems, would
permit a state to restrict the 'liberty interest' in terminating unwanted
life-sustaining medical treatment upon a lesser showing of need than would
have been required if the interest had been deemed 'fundamental.' 'Any
reasonable state interest' might suffice. 9 In any event the Cruzan Court did
not assume or even suggest that one has so much as a 'Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest' in assisted suicide. Quite the contrary. The
Court asserted that a state has an undeniable interest 'in the protection and
preservation of human life' and supported this assertion by noting:
[T]he majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties
on one who assists another to commit suicide. We do not think a State is
required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision
by a physically able adult to starve to death. 10
I share the view that the language quoted above amounts to an endorsement
of laws prohibiting assisted suicide (and laws permitting state intervention to
prevent suicide). 11
Cruzan is not the only Supreme Court case on which proponents of a right
to assisted suicide rely. They also find support for their views in the Court's
abortion cases. 12 In Roe v. Wade, 13 the Court informed us that 'a right of
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privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,' which had earlier
been invoked to invalidate restrictions on the use of contraceptives, 'is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.' 14 The Court cleared the way for its ultimate holding by rejecting
the state's argument that 'a fetus is a person' within the meaning of the
Constitution- 'the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
does not include the unborn.' 15
Although Roe did not concern the termination of a human life, as the Court
perceived the matter, the case has been read very broadly to support a 'right'
or 'liberty' to commit suicide and to enlist the assistance of others in doing
so. 16 So far as I am aware, however, no one who has read Roe this broadly has
taken into account that later in the same Term the Court rejected the notion
that 'our Constitution incorporates the proposition that conduct involving
consenting adults only is always beyond state regulation.' 17 It is noted at this
point that '[t]he state statute books are replete with constitutionally
unchallenged laws against prostitution, suicide ... and duels, although
these crimes may only directly involve "consenting adults.'' ' 18
The Court must have meant assisted suicide, not suicide, for two reasons:
(r) suicide itself does not involve consenting adults; and (2) at the time the
Court made this observation there were no state laws against suicide, but
there were many criminalizing assisted suicide.
A plausible argument may be made that the 'right of privacy' which
protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, at least in its early
stages, includes the 'right' or 'liberty' of a person, at least one terminally ill, to
make the choice whether to continue to live until death comes naturally or to
hasten death by the use of 'physician-prescribed medications.' 19 But a much
more persuasive argument may be made, I believe, that the 'right of privacy'
invoked in Roe encompasses the autonomy of sexual activity and relationships.
As Justice Blackmun wrote in a much-publicized consensual sodomy case,
'[s]exual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central
to ... the development of human personality"'; 'individuals define themselves
in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others'
and 'much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an
individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal
bonds.' 20 But Justice Blackmun wrote in dissent.
A majority of the Court in that case, Bowers v. Hardwick, upheld the
challenged ban against consensual sodomy as applied to homosexuals even
though the activity took place in private. Roe and other 'right of privacy'
cases were explained away on the ground that they involved family, marriage,
procreation, contraception and abortion. '[A]ny claim that these cases ...
stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between
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consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription IS
unsupportable.' 21
Robert Sedler, a well-known law professor and one of the lawyers
challenging the constitutionality of Michigan's prohibition against assisted
suicide, maintains that 'the essence of the "liberty" protected by the due
process clause is personal autonomy' which, he contends, encompasses a
person's right 'to control his or her own body, and to define his or her own
existence' (which, he claims, includes the right to end one's existence in
accordance with one's principles). 22 How does or can Professor Sedler
reconcile his views with Bowers v. Hardwick, which rejected a similar
argument in the context of sexual activities and relationships? A sphere of
conduct like that at issue in Hardwick seems much closer to marriage,
procreation, the use of contraceptives and abortion than the right to assisted
suicide. Sedler does not attempt to reconcile his views with Bowers v.
Hardwick. He ignores the case entirely.

COMPARING AND CONTRASTING SUICIDE, ASSISTED
SUICIDE AND ACTIVE EUTHANASIA

The right to active voluntary euthanasia
In recent decades we have witnessed a good deal of change in attitudes toward
death and dying, especially 'letting die.' But it is no less true today than it ever
was that active voluntary euthanasia (sometimes called 'consensual homicide')
is murder. Although there has long been a high incidence of failures to indict
and jury nullification in these cases/ 3 the law on the books in every state is
clear: If one intentionally and actively kills another, neither the fact that he
did so at the deceased's request nor the fact that the defendant was motivated
by 'mercy' excuses the homicide. One cannot waive one's right not to be killed. 24
To be sure, some commentators have forcefully argued that one should be
able to waive one's right not to be killed, at least where the person is
competent and makes an 'informed' decision that continued existence is no
longer desirable or sensible under the circumstances. 25 But to date no
American legislature nor any American court has accepted this argument in
the context of active voluntary euthanasia.

The right to assisted suicide
Assisted suicide falls somewhere between the termination of life support and
active voluntary euthanasia. (More about just where it falls later.) Active

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

229

voluntary euthanasia occurs when a person other than the one who dies
performs the last act - the one that actually brings about death. Assisted
suicide takes place when another person provides assistance but the suicidant
commits the last act herself. Although the two practices differ with respect to
who performs the 'last act,' they are similar in that each involves the active
intervention of another person to promote or to bring about death.
As the Cruzan Court noted, assisted suicide (although less widely
condemned than active voluntary euthanasia) is a crime in a majority of
American states. Most of the states that prohibit assisted suicide do so by
specific legislation, while some treat it as a form of murder or manslaughter. 26

Suicide, attempted suicide and assisted suicide
It is often said that since there is a 'right' to commit suicide it follows that
there is a right to assisted suicide as well. But I do not think if fitting or proper
to speak of a right to commit suicide.
Although one usually has the capacity to commit suicide, one does not have
the right to do so. The fact that we no longer punish suicide or attempted
suicide does not mean that we approve of these acts or that we recognize that
an individual's right to 'self-determination' or 'personal autonomy' extends
this far.
The decriminalization of both suicide and attempted suicide did not come
about because suicide was deemed a 'human right' or even because it was no
longer considered objectionable. Rather, it occurred because punishment was
seen as unfair to innocent relatives of the suicide and because those who
committed or attempted to commit the act were thought to be prompted by
mental illness. 27 However, the judgment that there is no form of criminal
punishment that is acceptable for a completed suicide and that criminal
punishment is singularly inefficacious to deter attempts to commit suicide
does not mean that there is a 'right' to commit the act. Much less does it mean
that one has a justifiable claim to assistance in committing the act. 28
That criminal punishment was thought to have no deterrent effect on
would-be suicides does not mean it would be ineffective in the case of
someone considering assisting another to commit suicide. And there is good
reason to invoke the criminal law in the latter case: '[T]he interests in the
sanctity of life' represented by the prohibition against criminal homicide
would seem to be 'threatened by one who expresses a willingness to
participate in taking the life of another, even though the act may be
accomplished with the consent, or at the request of, the suicide victim.' 29
This, at least, was the judgment of the eminent scholars who drafted the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (hereinafter the Code) in the
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1950s and 1960s. The Code is considered 'the principal text in criminal law
teaching, the point of departure for criminal law scholarship, and the greatest
single influence on the many new state codes that have followed in its wake.' 30
Although it criminalizes neither suicide nor attempted suicide, it does make
aiding or soliciting another to commit suicide a felony. 31
The Code's reporters considered the argument that in certain cases the
criminality of assisted suicide should turn upon 'the presence of a selfish
motive' - a position advanced by one of its special consultants, Glanville
Williams, a renowned British commentator and a leading proponent of
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. In the end, however, the reporters
concluded that 'the wiser course' in these cases 'is to maintain the prohibition
and rely on mitigation in the sentence when the ground for it appears.' 32
Recently, a proponent of physician-assisted suicide asked: 'How should
the law respond when a physician or other person helps an individual do
something that is legal in every state, when that legal activity is suicide?' 33 It
may be good advocacy to frame the question this way, but to do so strikes me
as quite misleading.
As already pointed out, the reasons that led to the decriminalization of
suicide and attempted suicide do not apply when one person 'helps' another
to commit suicide. Although there may be 'a certain moral extravagance in
imposing criminal punishment on a person who has sought his own
self-destruction [and] who more properly requires medical or psychiatric
attention,' 34 self-destruction 'is still a harm to be avoided, not a right to be
encouraged.'35 That is why, despite the fact that suicide itself is no longer a
crime, 'helping' another commit suicide - if 'help' means 'intentionally
providing the physical means' or 'intentionally participat[ing] in a physical
act' by which that other person dies by suicide36 - remains a crime in most states.

WOULD A NARROW EXCEPTION TO CURRENT CRIMINAL
PROHIBITIONS REMAIN A NARROW EXCEPTION FOR
VERY LONG?
Assisted suicide versus active voluntary euthanasia
Consider the following cases: A competent patient who has clearly made
known her wish to die accomplishes her purpose by swallowing a lethal dose
of medication which her physician has (a) placed under her pillow or on the
night table next to her bed; (b) placed in her hand; (c) put in her mouth. How
should we characterize these cases?
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It is fairly clear that (a) constitutes assisted suicide, but what of cases (b)
and (c)? I would say that (b) is also a case of assisted suicide because the lethal
process has not yet become irreversible. The patient still has a choice - she
could change her mind before putting the medication in her mouth and
swallowing it. I think case (c) is a very close call, but even here one could
argue that this, too, is an act of assisted suicide - if the patient is able to
remove the substance from her mouth or spit it out, but instead chooses to
swallow it. If so, then even here, one could argue, the patient still retains the
final choice.
Lawrence Gostin, the Editor-in-Chief of the journal of Law, Medicine and
Ethics, would disagree with me. He would say that both (b) and (c) should be
classified as active euthanasia because in both cases the physician did not
merely take part in the events leading up to the commission of the suicide but
'active[ly] participat[ ed] in an overt act directly causing death.' 37 (But if this
can be said of the physician who puts a lethal dose of medication in a patient's
hand, why can it not also be said of the doctor who places the medication
within a patient's easy reach?)
Whether one agrees with Gostin or me does not matter very much. What
does matter, I think, is that the distinctions among these closely related acts
are so fine that reasonable people (if I may include myself in that group)
cannot agree on which side they fall. 38
If so, how can these distinctions be defended on principle or maintained in
practice? Once we cross the line between the termination of life support and
the active intervention of another to promote or to bring about death, how
can we - and why should we - stop short of active voluntary euthanasia?
One who turns to the literature on the law and morality of assisted dying
soon discovers that the line between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia
is often blurred and sometimes completely obliterated. Voluntary euthanasia
'has been variously described as "assisted suicide"' and suicide has sometimes
been called 'self-administered euthanasia.' 3 ~ According to one leading writer
on the subject, active voluntary euthanasia is 'a form of suicide' and the case
for voluntary euthanasia 'depends upon the case for the righteousness of
suicide.' 40 Another commentator similarly maintains that 'the permissibility
of euthanasia follows from the permissibility of suicide. ' 41 Still another
considers voluntary euthanasia 'essentially a form of suicide involving the
assistance of others.' 42
The fine distinction between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia who performs the 'last act' - was badly smudged by the hard-fought
campaigns in the states of Washington (1991) and California (1992) to
legalize physician 'aid-in-dying' - a label covering both assisted suicide and
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active voluntary euthanasia. 43 I followed both campaigns very closely and
came away with the impression that many members of the media and general
public either did not understand the distinction between the two practices or
did not accept it.
Derek Humphry, the founder of the Hemlock Society, has probably
written more about the general subject than anyone else, and his books have
undoubtedly been read by more people than any others in the field. He uses
the terms suicide, assisted suicide, euthanasia and self-deliverance quite
loosely and almost interchangeably.
In a recent book, Dying with Dignity, Humphry tells his readers that he
had 'no knowledge or interest in euthanasia' until he helped his first wife die
by furnishing her 'a lethal potion of drugs with which she could end her life at
a time chosen by her.' 44 Thirty pages later he describes this incident as a
personal 'euthanasia experience.' 45 At another point he tells us that 'justifiable
suicide' is 'rational and planned self-deliverance' or 'autoeuthanasia.' 46 Some
ninety pages later he recalls that before the advent of Hemlock 'active
voluntary euthanasia (also known as self-deliverance and autoeuthanasia)
was a taboo subject in America.' 47 In a chapter on 'Euthanasia for the Elite,'
he maintains that 'euthanasia is already widely available to the elite,' because
'[w]ell off or well connected people often have medical friends who, in secret,
will pass out lethal drugs or actually make the injection.' 48
Some, no doubt, would dismiss Derek Humphry as a 'popularizer.' But
then they must deal with the eminent lawyer-philosopher, Ronald Dworkin.
On the opening page of his new book, Life's Dominion, Professor Dworkin
observes:
The argument over euthanasia has suddenly exploded into front-page news.
Doctors are now beginning openly to admit what the profession once kept
secret: that doctors sometimes kill patients who ask to die, or help such
patients to kill themselves. 49
Then, to illustrate his point that euthanasia 'has provoked intense
controversy' not only in the Netherlands but in America and elsewhere,
Dworkin discusses two cases. The first involves a New York physician who
'prescribed lethal drugs for a leukemia patient and told her how many she
should take to die.' The second involves a British doctor who 'injected
potassium chloride [a drug that has no analgesic effect] into a rheumatoid
arthritis patient ... begging to be killed.' 50 Some r8o pages later, Professor
Dworkin discusses the British case again. He then turns to what he calls 'a
similar case'- the aforementioned New York case. 5 1 I think it fair to say that
the fact that the British doctor performed active euthanasia and that the
American doctor only helped his patient commit suicide (and, arguably,
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provided a relatively low level of assistance at that) 52 does not interest
Dworkin. What does seem to bother him is that the British doctor was
convicted of attempted murder while the American doctor, who was involved
in 'a similar case,' was not even prosecuted.
Even if one believes (as Dworkin, Humphry and others evidently do not)
that there is an important distinction between assisted suicide and active
voluntary euthanasia in principle, it will be extremely difficult to contain that
principle in any subsequent litigation or to adhere to the distinction in practice.
If a patient's inability to commit suicide 'for either physiological or
psychological reasons' entitles her under certain circumstances to the active
intervention of another person in order to bring about her death, 53 why
should not a patient's inability- despite preliminary assistance- to perform
the last death-causing act, for either physiological or psychological reasons,
entitle her to active voluntary euthanasia? If assisted suicide is appropriate
when patients 'need more help from the physician than merely abating
treatment, but less help than would be required if they were asking the
physician to kill them,' 54 why is not active voluntary euthanasia appropriate
when less help than 'killing them' would not suffice, when patients are unable
to perform the ultimate act and thus nothing less than 'killing them' is
required to 'help' them die an 'easy' death?
Suppose a patient is unable to swallow the pills that will bring about her
death or is otherwise too weak to perform the last act that will fulfill her
persistent wish to die. If there is or ought to be a right to assisted suicide, how
can it be denied to such a person simply because she lacks the physical
capacity to perform the final act by herself?
Dr Timothy Quill, who helped a long-standing patient die by suicide, does
believe in drawing a line between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia,S5
but even he has a difficult time adhering to that line. Quill tells, approvingly, a
'moving story' about a physician who prescribed barbiturates to a patient in
an advanced stage of AIDS but who did not 'abandon his patient' when this
help proved inadequate:
The patient wanted to take the barbiturates he had saved for an overdose, but
was too weak to feed them to himself. Faced with this moment of truth, the
doctor helped his patient swallow the pills. 5 6

Can (should) the right to assisted suicide be confined to the
terminally ill? To those suffering unbearable pain?
One can understand an argument without accepting it. I understand the basic
argument for assisted suicide (and perhaps active voluntary euthanasia as
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well): Life has value only so long as it has meaning for the person whose life it
is and respect for 'self-determination' and 'personal autonomy' should entitle
a competent person to decide for herself whether, when and how she chooses
to end her life. If this argument is convincing, however, I have great difficulty
understanding why the 'right' or 'liberty' to assisted suicide should be limited
to the 'terminally ill' and/or those suffering unbearable pain.
If one is trying to establish a right to assisted suicide it is good tactics to
frame the issue narrowly - to speak, for example, only of a right to assisted
suicide for the terminally ill. Thus, lawyers for the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) have challenged the constitutionality of Michigan's ban on
assisted suicide insofar as it prohibits terminally ill patients from committing
suicide by making use of physician-prescribed medications. 57 But is there any
principled way to so limit the right? If either autonomy or the merciful
termination of an unendurable existence is the basis for this right, why limit it
to the terminally ill?
First of all, 'there is, in fact, no consensus on what is a "terminal
condition." ' 58 For example, although many states still define such a condition
as one that will shortly result in death regardless of the utilization of available
medical treatment, several states have recently adopted provisions defining
the condition as one that will soon cause death in the absence of medical
intervention. 59 Even if we could all agree on a definition of 'terminal
condition,' however, 'under a variety of circumstances life may be unendurable
to a reasonable person, even though he does not face the prospect of
immediate and painful death. ' 60
Timothy Quill, one of the most eloquent proponents of physician-assisted
suicide, would limit the right in various ways, but he would not confine it to
the terminally ill. The patient must have a condition, he tells us, 'that is
incurable and associated with severe, unrelenting suffering.' 61 Dr Quill does
'not want to arbitrarily exclude persons with incurable, but not imminently
terminal progressive illness, such as ALS (motoneurone disease) or multiple
sclerosis. ' 62 But is it any less arbitrary to exclude the quadriplegic? The victim
of a paralytic stroke? A person afflicted with severe arthritis?
If personal autonomy and the termination of suffering are the key factors
fueling the right to assisted suicide, why exclude those with non-terminal
illnesses or disabilities who might have to endure greater 'unbearable
suffering' for much longer periods of time than those who are likely to die in
the near future? Why does not a person who must continue to live what she
considers an unendurable existence for ten or twenty more years have an
equal- or even greater -claim or.. the liberty interest in assisted suicide than
those with terminal conditions?63
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In an effort to distinguish the terminally ill from all others who might seek
death by suicide, Professor Sedler maintains that 'the state cannot assert any
valid interest' in requiring a terminally ill person to wait untifdeath comes
naturally because 'there can be no valid interest in "preserving life" when
there is no "life left to preserve." ' 64 I really do not understand this argument.
Surely, Sedler is not saying that one who is terminally ill is no longer a
'person' or a 'human being'? Such a person may have a number of months to
live (a common definition of terminal illness is six months or less to live) and
her mental powers can hardly be substantially impaired if she 'chooses' to die
by suicide. For the present, at least, Sedler and his confreres are not
contending that persons who are no longer competent should have a right to
assisted suicide. Thus, if they prevail, and their ground rules are adopted,
assisted suicide could take place only if the person seeking such a death
retains sufficient decision-making capacity to exercise a voluntary, competent
choice. How can it be said that such a person has 'no "life left to preserve"'?
Of course, such a person may feel or honestly believe that her life is not a
'life' worth preserving. But so too may many others who suffer from
debilitating illnesses or severe disabilities, but who are not terminally ill.
As I understand the position of those advocating a constitutional right to
assisted suicide, one should have the same right to enlist the aid of others in
dying by suicide as one presently has to refuse or to withdraw life-sustaining
medical treatment. 65 .If so, it is fairly clear that once established the right to
assisted suicide would not be restricted to the terminally ill. For, as
demonstrated by the Elizabeth Bouvia case and other decisions involving
quadriplegics who apparently had long life expectancies, the right to refuse or
to reject medical treatment has not been so limited. 66 (Nor, for that matter,
has it been limited to the presently competent.)
Another restriction often placed on the right to assisted suicide is that the
person asserting this right must be experiencing 'intractable pain' or
undergoing 'unbearable suffering.' At first blush this appears to be a small,
easily identifiable group. But a closer look reveals this is not so.
First of all, although 'pain' and 'suffering' are often lumped together, the
two classifications are not identical. 'Not all pain leads to suffering (the pain
of the victorious distance runner leads to pleasure), nor does suffering require
the presence of physical pain (the anguish of knowing one has Alzheimer's
disease).' 67
If 'pain and suffering' means or includes physical pain, experts in the field
maintain that, although pain is admittedly notoriously undertreated in
America,'" 'almost all terminally ill patients can experience adequate relief
with currently available treatment.' 69 Thus a renowned pain control expert,

Yale Kamisar
the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center's Kathleen Foley, reports:
We frequently see patients referred to our Pain Clinic who have considered
suicide as an option, or who request physician-assisted suicide because of
uncontrolled pain. We commonly see such ideation and request dissolve with
adequate control of pain and other symptoms, using combinations of
pharmacologic, neurosurgical, anesthetic or psychological approaches/"
To be sure, '[d]ying patients often undergo substantial psychological
suffering that is not fully or even principally the result of physical pain. ' 71 But
suffering 'has no objective correlation with a patient's (medical) condition' 72
-it is 'variable from person to person' and 'externally unverifiable.' 73
If a right to assisted suicide were established, how could this right be denied
an otherwise qualified candidate who says her pain or suffering is 'unbearable'?
As a practical matter, would we not defer to the patient's own assessment of
her pain or suffering? As a matter of principle, shouldn't we?
So long as a person is competent and her desire to enlist the aid of others in
dying by suicide is firm and persistent, why should her 'right' to end her life in
the manner she chooses (if such a right exists) be denied because her ~ondition
does not satisfy someone else's standard of suffering?
Once a right to assisted suicide is established, any requirement that the
patient experience intolerable suffering will probably turn on the patient's
own view of her suffering- or drop out entirely. In a sense, the requirement
has already dropped out. The Washington and California proposals to
legalize 'physician aid-in-dying' required only that a 'qualified patient' be
afflicted with a terminal illness and express an enduring request for physician
intervention. Of course, such a patient need not be suffering from a painful
terminal illness or, if she is, might be receiving analgesic medications that,
even by the patient's own admission, adequately relieve her physical pain.
As ethicist Albert Jonsen recently observed, the language of legislative
proposals, such as those defeated in Washington and in California, is strong
evidence that 'fear of uncontrolled pain' (and, I would add, 'unbearable
suffering')
is no longer a major feature of the justifying arguments [for 'aid-in-dying'].
Autonomy, not pain or its merciful alleviation, is the principal and even sole
justifying argument offered by modern proponents. Opponents who argue, as
in the Washington and California campaigns, that modern methods of pain
control can virtually eliminate the category of 'intractable' pain are correct
enough, but they miss the mark: the right to choose death, not the presence of
pain, is now the issue. 74
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THE NEED FOR A COURT TO CONSIDER THE BROAD
IMPLICATIONS OF A 'NARROW' RIGHT TO ASSISTED
SUICIDE FOR THE TERMINALLY ILL
Professor Sedler tells us that the constitutional challenge he and his ACLU
colleagues have mounted against Michigan's anti-assisted suicide law is
'specific and narrow' - whether the la~ is invalid insofar as it prohibits the
terminally ill from obtaining medication~ from physicians that will enable
them .to commit suicide - and that the. 'COurts should address only this
particular issue/ 5 Indeed, he goes so far as .to say that the kind of 'slippery
slope' arguments I have made have 'no place' in constitutional litigation and
cannot be utilized 'to avoid' facing and confronting the specific question he
and his colleague have framed. 76
I could not disagree with him more. I do not believe a court can responsibly
face and confront the 'narrow' issue presented without considering the
general implications of the asserted right - without taking into account the
'slippery slope' arguments I have made (if one wants to call them that).
I have contended that drawing a line b~ween the terminally ill and other
seriously ill or disabled persons (who may have to endure more pain and
suffering for a much longer period of time) is neither sensible nor principled. I
have maintained, too, that the same may be said for drawing a line between
assisted suicide (for those who need some assistance from a physician) and
active voluntary eutha11asia (for those who need a physician to perform the
last, death-causing act). Is a judge supposed to put on blinders and forge
straight ahead without thinking about the consequences and ramifications of
her 'narrow' and 'specific' holding? Is this the way we are supposed to go
about resolving constitutional issues?
As the three justices who played the decisive role in reaffirming Roe v.
Wade observed:
Consistent with other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which
appear arbitrary without the necessity of offering a justification. But courts
may not. We must justify the lines we draw. 77 An eminent constitutional law professor, Herbert Wechsler, has felicitously
spelled out this important point:
[T]he main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be
genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate
result that is achieved. To be sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only the
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case they have before them. But must they not decide on grounds of adequate
neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but by
others that the principles imply? 78
Professor Sedler is unable to find any 'principled difference' in the
applicable constitutional doctrine between 'the right of a terminally ill
person' to withhold or to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment and the
right of such a person to enlist the aid of a physician in committing suicide. 79
It is now fairly clear, however, that the fact that a person may be kept alive for
many years (for example, a respirator-dependent quadriplegic whose mental
powers are unimpaired) is not a sufficient reason to deny her the right or
liberty to terminate life support. 80 Why, then, if a right to assisted suicide
exists for the terminally ill, should it be denied to those who may be kept alive
for many years? Whatever the answer, is it not appropriate for a judge to
consider this question before deciding whether there is a right to assisted
suicide for the terminally ill?
In arguing that there is a right to personal autonomy that encompasses the
right to assisted suicide, Professor Sedler and his colleagues rely very heavily
on the US Supreme Court's abortion cases. Physician-assisted suicide was
not, of course, the issue before the Court in any of those cases. If it is
appropriate to transcend the 'narrow' and 'specific' issue presented in a case
once it is decided, and to dwell instead - and to build on - its broad
implications, why is it improper to anticipate the implications of a soon-to-be
decided case and to call the court's attention to them?
That a proponent of the right to assisted suicide would speak only of- and
wish the courts to think only about- such a right for the terminally ill is quite
understandable. Such a narrowly circumscribed claim causes less alarm and
commands more general support than does a broader right to assisted suicide.
And, as Justice Frankfurter once observed, 'the function of an advocate is to
seduce.' 81
But the function of a court is to resist seduction, to rest its judgment on a
principle of general significance that may be consistently applied, and to
produce an intellectually coherent reason for a result which in like cases will
produce a like result. If so, how can a conscientious judge avoid considering
what other fact situations not presently before the court are (or are not) like
cases? If I may quote Justice Frankfurter a second time:
I am aware that we must decide the case before us and not some other case. But
that does not mean that a case is dissociated from the past and unrelated to the
future. We must decide this case with due regard for what went before and no
less regard for what may come after. 81
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Robert Sedler is part constitutional law commentator and part constitutional
litigator. In his first article on the subject Sedler-the-litigator appeared to
dominate- he refused to consider whether a right to assisted suicide would or
should extend beyond terminally ill persons. But in a more recent article,
Sedler-the-commentator seems to have come to the fore- this time Professor
Sedler does address the issue. He concludes that the right would and should
be available not only to those who have 'no life left to preserve' (his
characterization of the terminally ill), but to some who do have 'life left to
preserve' (for example, the person debilitated by multiple sclerosis who may
live for several additional years). 83 Comments Sedler:
The claim of the multiple sclerosis victim that for him life has become
unendurable, like the claim of the terminally ill person seeking to hasten
inevitable death, is objectively reasonable ... [S]ince the multiple sclerosis
victim is helpless to bring about his own death, a ban on physician assistance
to enable him to die so is obviously an undue burden on his right to end an
unendurable life. 84
Is Sedler's claim that there is or ought to be a right to assisted suicide for the
terminally ill at bottom only one aspect of a claim that there is or ought to be
such a right for any competent adult whose wish to die by suicide is
'objectively reasonable'? If so, why stop with the victim of multiple sclerosis?
As already pointed out, there are all sorts of reasons why life may seem
intolerable to a reasonable person. 85 'To argue that suicide is rational to
escape physical pain [or, I would add, to end a physically debilitated life], but
not suicide for any other reason, is to show oneself out of touch with the
depth and complexity of human motives.' 86 Moreover, all sorts of seriously ill
or severely disabled persons may have an 'objectively reasonable' wish to die,
though they may be physically or psychologically unable to bring about their
own deaths. They, too, may need someone else to perform the 'last act.'
How do we go about determining whether a competent person's firm
conclusion that life has become 'intolerable' is 'objectively reasonable'? Do
we turn to the writings of philosophers (many of whom are in disagreement
on this point)? Do we conduct opinion polls?
Moreover, if self-determination or personal autonomy is the major force
driving the right to assisted suicide, why should a competent person's firm
conclusion that life has become unendurable for her have to be 'objectively
reasonable'? Why should not a competent person's own evaluation of her
situation suffice?
I think it noteworthy that when a Michigan trial judge recently held that
there is a constitutional right to assisted suicide- so far as I am aware, the first
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American court squarely ever to do so - he drew a line neither (a) between
terminally ill people seeking to die by suicide and others wishing to do so nor
(b) between those experiencing severe 'pain and suffering' and others whose
pain and suffering was, or could be brought, under control. It is to this
decision that I now turn.

THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE
In February 1993, shortly after the number of people Jack Kevorkian had
helped to commit suicide had risen to fifteen, the Michigan legislature passed
a law making assisted suicide a felony, punishable by up to four years in
prison. The new law prohibits one with knowledge that another person
intends to commit suicide from 'intentionally providing the physical means'
by which that other person does so or from 'intentionally participat[ing] in a
physical act' by which she does so. 87
The law contains a number of exceptions. It recognizes the right to reject
unwanted medical treatment, even life-sustaining procedures, by specifically
excluding 'withholding or withdrawing medical treatment' from its coverage.
It also recognizes the principle of 'double effect' -that there is a significant
distinction between the intended effects of one's actions and the unintended
though foreseen effects. It does so by exempting 'prescribing, dispensing or
administering' medication or treatment designed 'to relieve pain or discomfort
and not to cause death, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or
increase the risk of death.' (Of course, if the medication administered were
designed to cause death, at the patient's request, it would be a case of active
voluntary euthanasia.)
These provisions led a prominent authority on legal issues in medicine,
George Annas, to say that, given its exceptions, the Michigan law was likely
to withstand constitutional challenge. 88 I would have put it even more
strongly. But before the year was out, in People v. Kevorkian, Wayne County
Circuit Judge Richard Kaufman ruled that the law violated the constitutionally
protected 'right' or 'liberty' to assisted suicide. 89
According to Judge Kaufman, (a) under certain conditions a competent
adult has a right to commit 'rational' suicide and (b) a total ban against
assisted suicide 'unduly burdens' this right. 90 Although the right is limited, it
is not confined to the 'terminally ill.' Nor does it require unendurable 'pain
and suffering.' Indeed, Judge Kaufman made no effort to distinguish between
those experiencing intolerable pain and suffering and those whose pain or
suffering was, or could be brought, under control.
The key factor, according to Judge Kaufman, is the presence or absence of
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'an objective medical condition' that is 'extremely unlikely to improve.' If a
person's quality of life is significantly impaired by such a medical condition,
even though it is not a life-threatening condition (presumably blindness, the
loss of a hand or permanent paralysis of a part of the body), and her decision
is made without undue influence, she may avail herself of the newly
discovered right. But if a person's quality of life is significantly diminished for
any other reason (for example, disgrace, financial ruin, the loss of one's entire
family in an airplane crash), she may not invoke the right- no matter how
competent she is or how firm and persistent her desire to die.
Many in the media reported that Judge Kaufman had drawn a line between
'rational' assisted suicide (which a state cannot prohibit} and the 'irrational'
kind (which a state may prevent). But this is not quite accurate. At one point
in his opinion, Judge Kaufman did express the view that 'if an adequate,
meaningful line can be drawn between rational and irrational suicide, the
liberty provision of the Due Process Clause protects a person's decision to
commit rational suicide.' 91 But the line he ultimately drew is not a line
between 'rational' and 'irrational' suicide. Rather, it is a line between one
category of 'rational' suicide- would-be suicides whose lives are significantly
impaired by irreversible medical conditions - and other categories of
'rational' suicide.
Judge Kaufman did not say that a suicide by one whose life is substantially
impaired by a medical condition constitutes the only form of 'rational'
suicide. He concluded, however, that such suicides are the only ones that may
safely be afforded constitutional protection.
This is the line that must be drawn, Judge Kaufman told us, 'since any form
of rational suicide that did not include the presence of an objective medical
condition would be too close to irrational suicide. ' 92 If constitutional
protection were extended to all persons who have a rational wish to die 'the
possibility that irrational suicide would increase is too great.' 93 Thus, the
state may prohibit not only 'irrational' suicide and assisted suicide, but some
classes of 'rational' suicide and assisted suicide as well - those 'where no
objective medical condition is present.'
In his extensive discussion of the 'rationality' of suicide, Judge Kaufman
relied heavily on the writings of Alfred Alvarez (an historian of attitudes
toward suicide) and Richard Brandt (a prominent American philosopher). So
far as I can tell, however, neither commentator would draw the line where
Judge Kaufman did. For example, in a passage that Judge Kaufman quotes
with apparent approval, Professor Brandt observes:
If we look over a list of the problems that bother people, and some of which
various writers have regarded as good and sufficient reasons for ending life,
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one finds (in addition to serious illness) things like the following: some event
which has made one feel ashamed or has cost one loss of prestige and status;
reduction to poverty as compared with former affluence; the loss of a limb or
physical beauty; the loss of sexual capacity; some event which makes it seem
impossible that one will achieve things by which one sets store; loss of a loved
one; disappointment in love; the infirmities of increasing age. It is not to be
denied that such things can be serious blows to one's prospects ofhappiness. 94
After discussing the views of the ancient Greeks and Romans, the Old
Testament and early Christian doctrine, Judge Kaufman concludes that
'there is significant support in our traditions and history for the view
approving suicide or attempted suicide.' 95 If Judge Kaufman is right about
this (though I doubt that he is), his own opinion makes plain that such
historical support was not limited to suicide by those whose quality of life
was significantly impaired by an objective medical condition. Thus, in a
passage that Judge Kaufman quotes, Alfred Alvarez observes:
According to Justinian's Digest suicide of a private citizen [during Roman
times] was not punishable if it was caused by 'impatience of pain or sickness,
or by another cause,' or by weariness of life . .. lunacy, or fear of dishonor.
Since this covered every rational cause, all that was left was the utterly
irrational suicide 'without cause,' and that was punishable ... 96
In the course of his opinion, Judge Kaufman sets forth and rejects an
argument I made in a recent article- that the social sanctioning of 'rational'
suicide and assisted suicide is likely to lead to an increase in 'irrational' (or
coerced or 'manipulated') suicide and assisted suicide. 97 He dismisses this
argument on the ground that I did not provide any support for it. 'Couldn't
one as effectively claim,' asks Kaufman, 'that by drawing a clear legal line
between rational suicide and irrational suicide, the stigma of committing
irrational suicide would increase?' 98
Is this line of reasoning persuasive? Does it find any support in our recent
experience with the 'right to die'? Until the recent legal assault on laws
prohibiting assisted suicide, many of us thought we had drawn a fairly clear
legal line - between the refusal or rejection of life-sustaining medical
treatment and the active intervention of another to promote or to bring about
death. So far as I know, however, nobody has suggested that drawing such a
line has increased the stigma of assisted suicide or active voluntary euthanasia.
Quite the contrary. At this very moment the firmly established right to refuse
or to withdraw medical treatment is being used as a lever- as an argument for
expanding the 'right to die' to include assisted suicide and active voluntary
euthanasia as wel1. 99
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Does Judge Kaufman (or anybody else for that matter) really believe that
affording constitutional protection to one form of 'rational' suicide and
assisted suicide will increase the stigma attaching to 'irrational' suicide? (Or
the stigma associated with other forms of 'rational' suicide?)
In writing the article Judge Kaufman quotes from, I relied heavily on the
studies of geriatric psychiatrists (who work with suicidal people every day)
and suicidologists (who perform 'psychological autopsies' of people who
commit suicide). They report that a suicide rarely occurs in the absence of a
major psychiatric disorder and that this observation is equally true in suicides
among the elderly. 100 More significant for our purposes, these experts
underscore the inability of depressed persons to recognize the severity of their
own symptoms and the failure of primary physicians to detect major
depression, especially in elderly patients. 101
'Ageism'- the prejudices and stereotypes applied to the elderly solely on
the basis of their age- may manifest itself in a failure to recognize treatable
depression, the view that an elderly person's desire to commit suicide is more
'rational' than a younger person's would be, or, more generally, the attitude
that the elder has every reason to be depressed. 102 As one authority has
pointed out: 'Although we shrink from the idea of elderly suicide and
euthanasia, we encourage it by our neglect and indifference.' 103 As another
commentator has observed:
Suicidal persons are succumbing to what they experience as an overpowering
and unrelenting coercion in their environment to cease living. This sense of
coercion takes many familiar forms: fear, isolation, abuse, uselessness, and so
on.1o4

Is it not fair to assume, as I do, that these pressures will intensify in a society
that sanctions assisted suicide (and thereby suicide as well)? Is it not fair to
assume that once assisted suicide is a lawful alternative and people are 'doing
it' and free to talk about it, more people, especially the sick and the old and
the vulnerable, will see this as the unselfish course to take- a tempting way to
spare both oneself and one's family the burdens of serious illness and/or
advanced age?
Of course, I cannot prove that in a suicide-permissive society a substantial
number of people who otherwise would not have pursued this route will be
encouraged or pressured or 'manipulated' into choosing death by suicide or
assisted suicide. 105 But then Judge Kaufman offers no support for his view
that if a line were not drawn 'requir[ing] the presence of objective medical
findings, the possibility that irrational suicide would increase is too great.' 106
If a judge can deny constitutional protection to some forms of 'rational'
assisted suicide out of concern that if he did not do so 'irrational' assisted
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suicide might get out of hand, why can a legislature not prohibit all forms of
'rational' assisted suicide on the same ground? If a judge may give weight to
the writings of philosophers in arriving at his conclusions about the
'rationality' of suicide (Judge Kaufman quotes philosopher Richard Brandt
six times, three times at considerable length), why can a legislature not rely on
the studies and published findings of suicidologists and geriatric psychiatrists
to reach a different conclusion?
After all, as one commentator said (and I am happy to report that he is a
philosopher):
If philosophers have something to say to the law, so also has the law something
to say to philosophers. Attention to the working, or the possible working, of
any institution or principle may well give us insight into weaknesses which
remain concealed so long as it is posed in sufficiently abstract terms. 107

SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
When I first wrote about this subject, thirty-six years ago, the chance that any
state would legalize active voluntary euthanasia seemed minuscule and the
possibility that any court would find the right of active voluntary euthanasia
protected by the Due Process Clause seemed so remote as to be almost
inconceivable. Not any more.
Before this decade ends I believe there is (a) a strong probability that at
least several states will decriminalize active voluntary euthanasia (no doubt
under the euphemistic label 'aid-in-dying'); and (b) a distinct possibility that
at least several appellate courts will announce a state or federal constitutional
right to active voluntary euthanasia. I continue to believe the US Supreme
Court will not discover or recognize such a right, but the possibility that it
may can no longer be disregarded.
What we cannot do in one step- perhaps even think about doing- we can
often do in two or three or four. The modern history of our activities and
beliefs about the law and ethics of death and dying is a good illustration- it is
'a history of lost distinctions of former significance' 108 (e.g. 'extraordinary
means' versus 'ordinary means,' the respirator versus the feeding tube).
My colleague Carl Schneider has called this step-by-step process 'a
psychological aspect of slippery slopes': They work partly by 'domesticating
one idea' (say, disconnecting the respirator) and thus making its nearest
neighbor (terminating 'artificial' feeding) 'seem less extreme and unthinkable.' 109
What many used to call 'negative' or 'passive' euthanasia has become a fait
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accompli in modern medicine. The next sequence of events is likely to be
physician-assisted suicide for (a) the terminally ill, (b) those with an 'objective
medical condition' that significantly diminishes the quality of life, and (c)
those whose wish to die is 'objectively reasonable.' If so, as this progression
unfolds, active voluntary euthanasia will become more thinkable, more
tenable and more supportable.
Proponents of an expansive 'right to die' have had considerable success in
overcoming resistance step by step, blotting out one distinction after another.
And there is no reason to think that this process will come to a halt. One
important distinction remains - and it is not the distinction between assisted
suicide and active voluntary euthanasia. As I have tried to show, this
distinction is too thin to endure for very long. Indeed, even now, it is a
distinction that the media, the public and even many commentators on the
subject are either unable or unwilling to take seriously.
The one formidable distinction that remains is the one that is presently
under attack - 'the historic divide' 110 between the termination of medical
treatment and the active intervention of another to promote or to bring about
death. If opponents of active voluntary euthanasia are unable to defend the
bridge spanning this divide, they will have lost the war. For if this bridge falls,
the flimsy bridge between assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia
seems sure to follow.

AFTERWORD

In April 1994 I finished my chapter and sent it to the editor of this collection
for publication. But the last eight months of 1994 turned out to be an
extraordinarily eventful time for those interested in the law, politics and
ethics of assisted suicide.
Some may regard the Oregon voters' approval on 8 November of a
measure (Ballot Measure 16) authorizing physicians, under certain conditions,
to prescribe lethal medication for competent, terminally ill adults who
request it' 11 as the most significant event of 1994. I think not.
After losing two hard-fought campaigns by fairly close votes in the states of
Washington (1991) and California (1992), 112 proponents of assisted suicide
were bound to prevail in some state sooner or later. Unlike the proposals
which failed earlier, the Oregon measure requires that medication prescribed
under the Act be self-administered. 113 Moreover, as discussed earlier, writing
a prescription for a lethal medication that a patient might take to end her life
is a relatively low level of assistance. 114
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It is not at all clear what bearing, if any, the Oregon vote has on the
question of whether there is a constitutional right or liberty to assisted
suicide. It may even work against the establishment of such a right or liberty.
For one thing, the Oregon vote demonstrates again that when American
voters actually cast their ballots, they are closely divided on the issue: The
more extensive Washington and California proposals failed by a 54 percent to
46 percent vote; the considerably more limited Oregon proposal barely
passed by a 51 percent to 49 percent margin. Moreover, the fact that
proponents of assisted suicide finally gained a victory in Oregon could
conceivably lead a Justice who favors some form of physician-assisted suicide
as a matter of public policy to decline to constitutionalize the area. He or she
might do so for the reason that judicial intervention at this time might halt a
political process that is viewed as moving in the right direction and prolong
divisiveness and defer stable settlement of the issue. 115
More noteworthy in 1994, I think, than the approval of the Oregon
measure were events that occurred in the courthouse of Seattle, Washington,
and the state of Michigan.
On 2 May a jury acquitted Dr Jack Kevorkian of violating Michigan's
prohibition against assisted suicide. Although some hailed the acquittal as
proof that no jury would ever convict Kevorkian, I believe (on the basis of the
jury's requests to re-examine certain evidence and various jurors' post-verdict
statements to the press) that the outcome turned more on geography and
semantics than it did on jury nullification. 116
The very next day, the Chief Judge of the US District Court in Seattle,
Washington, Barbara Rothstein, became the first federal judge to strike down
a statute outlawing assisted suicide on Fourteenth Amendment due process
grounds. In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117 she invalidated a
Washington state law prohibiting assisted suicide insofar as it placed an
undue burden on competent, terminally ill adults who seek physician-assisted
suicide.
Judge Rothstein deemed a terminally ill person's right to choose
physician-assisted suicide no less intimate or personal a decision and no less
deserving of constitutional protection than a pregnant woman's right to
choose abortion. In the main Judge Rothstein adopted the reasoning of the
Michigan Civil Liberties Union as set forth in Robert Sedler's article. 118 Judge
Rothstein made no more effort than did Professor Sedler to reconcile her
expansive reading of the abortion cases with Bowers v. Hardwick, a case that
upheld a ban against consensual sodomy as applied to homosexuals. 119 She,
too, ignored the case entirely.
The state of Washington argued, inter alia, that a line had been drawn-
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and should be maintained - between the termination of life-sustaining
medical treatment and active intervention to promote or to bring about
death. But Judge Rothstein was unmoved. From a constitutional perspective,
she concluded, there is no meaningful distinction between the right to refuse
or to withdraw medical treatment, a course of action that results in death,
and the right of a competent, terminally ill person to achieve the same end by
using drugs prescribed or provided by a physician.
Only one other American Court, a Michigan trial court, had ever held that
there is a constitutional right to assisted suicide. 120 But on 10 May the
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed that court on this point. 121 A 2-1
majority rejected the argument that the right to suicide or suicide assistance is
a 'logical extension of [the] catalog of rights' protected by the 'guarantee of
personal privacy.' 122 Seven months later, in People v. Kevorkian 123 and
Hobbins v. Attorney General/ 24 a 5-2 majority of the Michigan Supreme
Court announced its agreement with the Court of Appeals on this point,
explicitly rejecting the analysis utilized in Compassion in Dying:
The advocates of assisted suicide ask us to adopt the reasoning of a recent
federal decision that invalidated the State of Washington's criminal prohibition
against assisted suicide [referring to Compassion in Dying] ... We disagree
with the federal court that either Cruzan or [Planned Parenthood v.] Casey
preordains that the Supreme Court would find that any persons, including the
terminally ill, have a liberty interest in suicide that is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Those who assert such a right misapprehend the
nature of the holdings in those cases.
In Cruzan, the Court was able to 'assume' a protected liberty interest in the
withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment because it was able to
distinguish between acts that artificially sustain life and acts that artificially
curtail life. Although some suggest that this is a distinction without constitutional
significance - a meaningless exercise in semantic gymnastics - the Cruzan
majority disagreed and so do we ...
. . . [W]hereas suicide involves an affirmative act to end a life, the refusal or
cessation of life-sustaining medical treatment simply permits life to run its
course, unencumbered by contrived intervention ...
. . . [P]ersons who opt to discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment are
not, in effect, committing suicide. There is a difference between choosing a
natural death summoned by an uninvited illness or calamity, and deliberately
seeking to terminate one's life by resorting to death-inducing measures
unrelated to the natural process of dying .
. . . In Casey, the Court was not directly concerned with the establishment
of a new right, but rather with whether the Court should retreat from the right
previously recognized in Roe v. Wade. In declining to overrule Roe, and
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relying heavily on the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court emphasized that
abortion cases are unique ...
(T]he right to commit suicide is neither implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty nor deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition. It would be an
impermissibly radical departure from existing tradition, and from the
principles that underlie that tradition, to declare that there is such a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. 125
The fact that within the space of seven months a federal district court and a
state supreme court reached opposite conclusions as to whether one has a
constitutionally protected 'right' or 'liberty' to obtain a person's assistance in
committing suicide indicates that American courts may disagree about this
issue for the next several years- until it is decided by the US Supreme Court.
But on 25 May 1994 an event occurred that is likely to have a significant
impact on how this issue is ultimately resolved. That day the 24-member New
York State Task Force on Life and the Law issued a 181-page report
unanimously rejecting proposals to legalize assisted suicide and voluntary
active euthanasia.' 26
The Task Force is an influential body whose previous legislative proposals
had reflected deep respect for individual autonomy. (Seven years earlier this
same group had taken the position, at a time when the issue was still hotly
disputed, that the right to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment
includes the right to withhold and withdraw artificial nutrition and
hydration. 127 ) But in 1994 the Task Force balked at crossing 'the historic divide':
In light of the pervasive failure of our health care system to treat pain and
diagnose and treat depression, legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia
would be profoundly dangerous for many individuals who are ill and
vulnerable. The risks would be most severe for those who are elderly, poor,
socially disadvantaged, or without access to good medical care. 128
The Task Force recognized that 'one can posit "ideal" cases in which all
the recommended safeguards [for assisted suicide] would be satisfied:
patients would be screened for depression and offered treatment, effective
pain medication would be available, and all patients would have a supportive,
committed family and doctor. ' 129 But
the reality of existing medical practice in doctors' offices and hospitals across
the state generally cannot match these expectations, however any guidelines or
safeguards might be framed. These realities render legislation to legalize
assisted suicide and euthanasia vulnerable to error and abuse for all members
of society, not only for those who are disadvantaged ... Constructing an
ideal or 'good' case is not sufficient for public policy, if it bears little relation to
prevalent medical practice. 130
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In light of the fact that Task Force members considered the legalization of
assisted suicide and euthanasia from different backgrounds and perspectives,
the unanimity of their recommendation that the total prohibition against
these practices should remain intact is surprising and, I believe, quite
significant. Although some of the Task Force members were of the view that
assisted suicide and euthanasia are inherently wrong, others were not. 131
Indeed, members of this second group believed that in appropriate circumstances
assisting a patient to commit suicide 'would manifest a physician's commitment
and duty to his or her patient.' 132 Nonetheless, these members concluded that
legalizing assisted suicide 'would be unwise and dangerous public policy.' 133
They regarded 'the consequences of quietly tolerating assisted suicide as a
private act of agreement between two individuals in extreme cases as
profoundly different' 134 from the consequences of legalizing the activity:
In addition to regulating and restraining behavior, our laws also serve a highly
symbolic function ... The legal prohibition, while not uniformly honored,
preserves the gravity o{conduct to assist suicide and prevents abuse ...
By curtailing the autonomy of patients in a very small number of cases when
assisted suicide is a compelling and justifiable response [the legal prohibition]
preserves the autonomy and well-being of many others. It also prevents the
widespread abuses that would be likely to occur if assisted suicide were
legalized. 135
As might be expected from the foregoing discussion of its report, the Task
Force resoundingly rejected the view that one has a 'constitutional right' to
commit suicide or to obtain suicide assistance. In sharp contrast to the
position taken by Judge Rothstein in the Compassion in Dying case, the Task
Force drew 'a clear line' for constitutional purposes, as well as for public
policy and medical practice, 'between forgoing medical interventions and
assistance to commit suicide or euthanasia.' 136
Although Judge Rothstein had read the 'right to die' cases as establishing a
broad right to determine the timing and manner of one's death, the Task
Force maintained that 'these cases stand for the more limited proposition that
individuals have a right to resist bodily intrusions, and to preserve the
possibility of dying a natural death.' 137 The report emphasized that 'the
imposition of life-sustaining medical treatment against a patient's will
requires a direct invasion of bodily integrity and, in some cases, the use of
physical restraints, both of which are flatly inconsistent with society's basic
conception of personal dignity. ' 138 lt is this right against intrusion, maintained
the Task Force '-not a general right to control the timing and manner of
death- that forms the basis of the constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment.' 139 Restrictions on suicide, on the other hand, 'entail no such
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intrusions, but simply prevent individuals from intervening in the natural
process of dying. ' 140
Although the Task Force's analysis of the 'right to die' cases may influence
some members of the Supreme Court, this analysis constitutes only a small
part of the report and the Justices are likely to feel this is the one aspect of the
problem about which they need the least help. They are more likely to be
impressed by the tone, quality, depth and documentation of the Task Force's
findings, reasoning and public policy arguments.
The Court will likely be affected by the Task Force's thoughtful discussion
of the 'state of vulnerability' produced by serious illness; the uncertainty in
estimating a patient's life expectancy and the fallibility of medical practice
generally; the severe shortcomings of current pain relief practices and
palliative care; the very small number of individuals who make an informed,
competent choice to die by suicide (particularly if appropriate pain relief and
supportive care are provided) and who cannot achieve their goal without
another person's assistance; the close link between assisted suicide and active
voluntary euthanasia; the elasticity and instability of the criteria now
proposed as safeguards if and when assisted suicide and euthanasia are
integrated into medical practice (for example, once euthanasia becomes 'an
accepted "therapy"' there is a distinct possibility that patients incapable of
consenting will, in certain respects, 'seem the "best" candidates for the
practice'); and the recognition that assisted suicide and euthanasia 'will be
practiced through the prism of social inequality and prejudice that characterizes
the delivery of services in all segments of society, including health care.' 141
To be sure, any American legislature remains free to reject the Task Force
report as a matter of public policy. But how can it be said that a legislature
that is impressed by the same nonreligious arguments against assisted suicide
that influenced the Task Force and arrives at the same conclusions the Task
Force did has acted unconstitutionally?

NOTES
I am indebted to University of Michigan law student Marc Spindelman for
valuable research assistance and for helpful comments.
Charles Black, The People and the Court
88 (1960).
2 In re: Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A. 2d 647
(1976).
3 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1980).
I

4 See Quinlan, 355 A. 2d at 665,670 & n. 9·
'The assertion that rejection of life-saving
medical treatment by competent patients
constitutes suicide,' observes Norman
Cantor, The Permanently Unconscious
Patient, Non-Feeding and Euthanasia, 15

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

5

6

7
8
9

IO

II

12

13
14

15
16
17
r8
19
20
21
22

Am. J. Law & Med. 381, 433 (1989), 'has
been uniformly rejected- usually based on
a distinction between letting nature take
its course and initiating external deathcausing agents.'
Derek Humphry & Ann Wickett, The
Right to Die 242 (First Hemlock Society
ed. 1990).
In Quinlan the state court permitted an
unconscious patient to be removed from a
respirator, as her family desired; in Cruzan,
the Supreme Court upheld the state's power
to keep an unconscious patient on a feeding
tube, over her family's objection, because
the patient had not left clear instructions
for ending life-sustaining treatment.
497 U.S. at 279.
Id. at 279 n. 7·
See John Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status ofNontreatment Decisions
for Incompetent Patients, 25 Ga. L. Rev.
II39, II74""75 & n. 132 (1991).
497 U.S. at 280.
See Louis Michael Seidman, Confusion at
the Border: Cruzan, 'The Right to Die,'
and the Public/Private Distinction, 1991
Sup. Ct. Rev. 47, 53, 62.
See, e.g., Robert Sedler, The Constitution
and Hastening Inevitable Death, Hastings
CenterRep.,23 no. 5 (1993),at2o. Professor
Sedler is one of the lawyers challenging the
constitutionality of a Michigan law which
makes assisted suicide a felony.
410 U.S. Il3 (1973).
Id. at 152-53. But the right is not absolute.
Thus, the state's compelling interest in
protecting life after viability enables it to
proscribe abortion during that period except
when necessary to protect the mother's life
or health.
Id. at 157-58.
See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 12.
Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
68 (1973) (a well-known obscenity case).
Id. at 68 n. 15.
See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 12, at 24.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. r86, 205
(1986) (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 191.
Sedler, supra note 12, at 23. This view

seems very close to the attitude of the
Romans, who, we are told, looked on
suicide 'as a carefully considered and chosen
validation of the way they had lived and
the principles they had lived by,' Alfred
Alvarez, The Background, in Suicide: The
Philosophical Issues 7, 22 (M. Battin & D.
Mayo eds. 1980).
In formulating his argument, Professor
Sedler uses snippets from the Court's long
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
II2 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), such as '[a]t the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's
concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human
life.' Id. at 2807. Casey did reaffirm Roe,
but so far as I am aware nobody has
suggested that it overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick.
Moreover, in reaffirming the 1973 abortion cases the Casey majority relied heavily
on '[t]he obligation to follow precedent'
and the 'indispensable' nature of 'a respect
for precedent.' Id. at 2808. Three of the
Justices who voted to reaffirm Roe (none
of whom was on the Court when Roe was
decided) observed that'[ w ]e do not need to
say whether each of us, had we been
Members of the Court [when Roe was
decided], would have concluded, as the
Roe Court did, that [the weight of the
State's interest in protecting the potentiality
of life] is insufficient to justify a ban
on abortions prior to viability . . . The
matter is not before us in the first instance
... 'Id. at 2817 (O'Connor, Kennedy and
Souter, JJ.).
23 See Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious
Views Against Proposed 'Mercy-Killing'
Legislation, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 969,971-73
(1958).
24 See e.g. Wayne LaFave & Austin Scott, I
Substantive Criminal Law 330 (2d ed.
1986); Alan Meisel, The Right to Die
61~2 (1989); Lawrence Gostin, Drawing a
Line between Killing and Letting Die: The
Law, and Law Reform, on Medically
Assisted Dying, 21 J. L. Med. & Ethics 94,
96 (1993); Sanford Kadish, Letting Patients
Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 8o Cal.

Yale Kamisar
L. Rev. 857, 858 (1992).
25 See, e.g., Dan Brock, Voluntary Active
Euthanasia, Hastings Center Rep., 22 no. 2
(I992) at 10, I4.
26 According to Thomas Marzen, 'Out, Out

Brief Candle: Constitutionally Prescripted
Suicide for the Terminally Ill', 21 Hastings
Con. L. Q. 799, 804 (1994), 'assisted suicide
is separately punishable by statute in thirty
states.' Marzen lists the 30 specific criminal
code provisions in a long footnote, id. at
804, n. 21. The same 30 states are listed in
Alan Meisel, The Right to Die: 1994 Cum.
Supp. No. r at 6o-6r.
According to Timothy Quill, a wellknown proponent of physician-assisted
suicide, 36 states prohibit the practice. See
Quill, Death and Dignity, I41 (1993). Quill
is probably including those states which
ban the practice under their general criminal
homicide laws as well as those that do so
by specific legislation. In some states which
do not have specific statutes on the subject
it is unclear whether assisted suicide is
treated as a type of murder or manslaughter.
Until recently this ambiguity reigned in the
state of Michigan. It was only after several
trial courts dismissed murder indictments
against Jack Kevorkian for assisting in
suicides on the ground that such an act was
not covered by the general homicide laws
of the state that the legislature enacted
specific legislation on the subject.
27 See Thomas Marzen, et al., Suicide: A
Constitutional Right?, 24 Duq. L. Rev. I,
68-IOO (I985).
28 See Leon Kass, Is There a Right to Die?,
Hastings Center Rep. 23, no. I (I993) at
34> 35·
29 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code
and Commentaries, Part r, § 210.5 (1985)

at p.

100.

30 Sanford Kadish, The Model Penal Code's
Historical Antecedents, Rutgers L. J. 521
(I988).
3I American Law Institute, Model Penal Code,
Part II, § 210.5 (Official Draft, 1962).
32 See Model Penal Code (Tentative Draft
No. 9, I959) at pp. 56-57.

33 Robert Weir, The Morality of Physician-

Assisted Suicide, I7 Law, Med. & Health
Care u6, 125 (1992).
34 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code
and Commentaries, Part I,§ 2I0.5 (I985) at
p. 94·
35 Thomas Marzen, supra note 26, at 804. As
Marzen notes, id. at n. 20, every American
state provides for the involuntary commitment of persons who are a danger to
themselves.
36 At this point, I am quoting from the
language of Michigan's I993 law against
assisted suicide. See generally George Annas,
Physician-Assisted Suicide - Michigan's
Temporary Solution, 328 N. Eng.]. Med.
1573 (I993). See also the discussion in note
38 infra. 'Providing the means of suicide
appears to be the act against which the
assistance statutes are primarily directed.'
Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting
Suicide, 86 Colum. L. Rev 348, 360 (I986).
37 Gostin, supra note 24, at 96.
38 As pointed out in David Watts & Timothy
Howell, Assisted Suicide Is Not Voluntary
Euthanasia, 40 ]. Am. Geriatr. Soc. 1043
(1992), assisted suicide involves various
levels of assistance. According to the
authors, they include supplying information;
writing prescriptions for lethal medication
that a patient might use to kill herself;
providing the physical means, i.e., the
lethal dose of medication or poison itself;
and 'supervising or directly aiding' the
suicide, the type of involvement characterizing the activities of Jack Kevorkian. But
see Glenn Graber, Assisted Suicide Is Not
Voluntary Active Euthanasia, But It's Awfully Close, 41 ]. Am. Geriatr. Soc. 88
(1993) (editorial).
Not surprisingly, those who favor assisted
suicide but balk at active voluntary euthanasia, try to put as much distance as
possible between the two concepts by
comparing and contrasting relatively low
levels of assistance with active euthanasia.
When they speak of assisted suicide they
usually talk about supplying Hemlock
Society material or other information,
providing a prescription or discussing
required doses - but not supervising the

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

suicide or intentionally furnishing the
physical means by which a person dies by
suicide. See e.g. Weir, supra note 33, at n 8
(emphasis added):
If a physician is involved, the difference
[between assisted suicide and active euthanasia]
in personal involvement is between providing
a suicidal patient with a prescription that
would be lethal if taken by the patient in
certain amounts, compared with the physician
personally administering a lethal injection to
the patient at the patient's request ... A
physician who responds to a patient's request
for assistance in committing suicide cannot
be certain, merely by providing a prescription
or discussing dosage, either that the patient
will follow through with the attempt at
self-destruction or that the attempt at causing
his or her death will actually work.
I very much doubt that supplying information about suicide is or should be viewed
as 'assisted suicide' at all. I do not think
any American prosecutor would try to
convict someone for providing a friend or
relative information that might prove useful
in committing suicide - even if it could be
established (and this would be extremely
hard to do) that the defendant's intent was
to cause death.
There is plenty of information about
how to commit suicide in Derek Humphry's
best-selling book, Final Exit: The Practi-

calities of Self-Deliverance and Assisted
Suicide for the Dying (1991). Indeed, as the
author makes plain in his Introduction, the
book 'is aimed at helping the public and
the health professional achieve death with
dignity for those who desire to plan for it.'
Id. at 18. Hundreds of thousands of copies
of this book have been sold and no doubt
many have been given or lent to friends
and relatives. So far as I know, no prosecutions have been brought for such acts. If a
prosecutor were foolhardy enough to try
to convict someone of assisted suicide for
lending a sick friend or relative a copy of
Final Exit I think he would soon run afoul
of the First Amendment.
I have not studied the other twenty-nine
state Ia ws banning assisted suicide, but I

am familiar with the Michigan statute. It
does not cover supplying information about
suicide at all. Nor do I believe, although
this is less clear, that it prohibits a physician
from prescribing drugs for a sick patient
who might use them to kill herself- not at
least if it is a prescription for drugs that
have a legitimate medical use. The statute
prohibits one 'who has knowledge that
another person intends [to] commit suicide'
from 'intentionally' 'participat(ing] in a
physical act' or 'provid[ing] the physical
means' by which the other person commits
suicide. I share the view that 'physicians
who write prescriptions do not provide the
'physical means' to commit suicide, any
more than someone who gives a person
money to fill the prescription or a car to get
it would provide the physical means.' Annas,
supra note 36, at I 574·
39 George Smith, All's Well that Ends Well:

Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational
Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination, 22 U. C. Davis L. Rev. 275,
279-80 (1989)40 Joseph Fletcher, Morals and Medicine 176
(1954). Fletcher was a famous medical
ethicist and a prolific writer who advocated
active euthanasia for some fifty years.
41 James Rachels, The End ofLife: Euthanasia
and Morality 86-87 (1986).
42 Raanan Gillon, Suicide and Voluntary
Euthanasia in Euthanasia and the Right to
Death 173-74 (A. B. Downing ed. 1969).
43 See generally Alexander Morgan Capron,
Proposition r6r: What Is at Stake?, Commonweal, Sept. 1992 (Special Supp.) at 2;
Rob Carson, Washington's I-n9, Hastings
Center Rep. 22, no. 2 (1992) at 7· Both the
Washington state proposal to legalize 'aid
in dying' (Initiative II9) and the California
proposal to do the same (Proposition 161)
failed by a 54 percent to 46 percent margin.
See Alexander Morgan Capron, Even in

Defeat, Proposition I6I Sounds a Warning,
Hastings Center Rep. no. 1 (1993) at 32.
44 Derek Humphry, Dying with Dignity:
Understanding Euthanasia 70 (1992).
45 Id. at 102.
46 Id. at 79·

254

Yale Kamisar

47 Id. at 171.
48 Id. at 159. (Emphasis added.)
49 Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An
Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia,
and Individual Freedom 3 (1993). (Emphasis
added.)
50 See id. at 3-4. The American case involved
Dr Timothy Quill, who was not prosecuted
for assisted suicide, a felony in his state;
the British case involved Dr Nigel Cox,
who was convicted of attempted murder.
See id. at 184-86.
51 See id. at 184-85.
52· See the discussion in note 38 supra.
53 Weir, supra note 33, at n8.
54 Id.
55 See Timothy Quill, Death and Dignity:
Making Choices and Taking Charge I 57--60
(1993).
56 Id. at 137.
57 See Sedler, supra note 12, at 20.
58 Marzen, supra note 26, at 814.
59 See Yale Kamisar, When is There a Constitutional 'Right to Die'? When is There No
Constitutional 'Right to Live'?, 25 Ga. L.
Rev. 1203, 12ro-n (1991) and authorities
collected therein. Moreover 'terminal' is
variously defined as occurring in 'a relatively
short time,' 'imminent,' when treatment
only 'postpones the moment of death,'
when the patient is 'incurable' and/ or her
condition 'hopeless.' See id.; Marzen, supra
note 26, at 814 & n. 54·
6o Alan Sullivan, A Constitutional Right to
Suicide, in Suicide: The Philosophical Issues
229,241 (M. Battin & D. Mayo eds. 1980).
61 Quill, supra note z6, at 162. (Emphasis
added.)
62 Id. (Emphasis added.)
63 See Marzen, supra note 26, at 8oo. See also
Robert Wennberg, Terminal Choices 99
(1989).
64 Sedler, supra note 12, at 24. (Emphasis in
the original.)
65 See id. at z 3-24.
66 See Bouvia v. Superior Court (Glenchar),
225 Cal. Rep. 2.97 (Ct. App. 1986). Elizabeth
Bouvia was not terminally ill, unconscious,
or mentally retarded. Indeed, she was
'intelligent, very mentally competent' and

67
68

69
70

'alert.' Id. at 300, 305. Nevertheless, the
California Court of Appeal granted the
relief she sought- removal of the nasogastric
tube keeping her alive against her will. To
the same effect are McKay v. Bergstedt,
8o1 P. 2d 617 (Nev. 1990) and State v.
McAfee, 385 S.E. zd 651 (Ga. 1989). Both
cases involved respirator-dependent quadriplegics who apparently had long life
expectancies.
To be sure, none of these cases were
decided by the US Supreme Court, but they
have been well received by lawyers, physicians, bioethicists and medico-legal commentators. Thus Professor Alan Meisel
recently called the view that a patient must
be terminally ill for life support to be
stopped one of the 'myths' about terminating medical treatment that should be
dispelled. See Meisel, Legal Myths about
Terminating Life Support, 109 Archives
Int. Med. 1497, 1498--99 (1991).
Moreover, in the Cruzan case, the Supreme Court failed to attach any significance
to the fact that Nancy Cruzan was not
dying or terminally ill, as these terms are
usually defined. No doubt many thought
that she 'might as well be dead' or that she
was 'better off dead,' but if her feeding
tube had not been removed (after the case
was remanded and additional evidence
was presented that she would have wanted
to die under the circumstances), she might
have been kept alive another twenty or
thirty years.
Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream of
Life: Living with Mortality 95 (1993).
Judith Ahronheim & Doron Weber, Final
Passages 99-II4 (1992). The authors note
that '[t]he majority of clinicians- including
cancer specialists- receive very inadequate
training in pain assessment and pain management,' id. at 99, and that important
information about pain control for the
terminally ill and other patients has only
'started to enter the curriculum of medical
schools.' Id. at II2.
Id. at 102.
Kathleen Foley, The Relationship of Pain
and Symptom Management to Patient

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide,].
Pain & Sym. Management 1991; 6:289,290.
Adds Dr Foley, id. at 292: 'The high cost of
pumps, drugs, and home care supervision
on a 24-hour basis makes [pain control]
only available to a limited number of
patients who have appropriate health care
coverage. By rationing pain management
on a financial basis, patients are being
forced to consider death as their only
option.'
71 Dan Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia,
Hastings Center Rep. 22, no. 2 (1992), at
IO,

!6.

72 Maurice A.M. de Wachter, Euthanasia in
the Netherlands, Hastings Center Rep. 22,
no. 2 (1992), at 23, 25.
73 Callahan, supra note 67, at 102.
74 Albert Jensen, To Help the Dying Die- A
New Duty for Anesthesiologists? (Editorial),
Anesthesiology 78: 225, 227 (1993).
75 See Sedler, supra note 12, at 22-24.
76 Id. at 23.
77 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791,2817 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy &
Souter, JJ.) (plurality opinion).
78 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. I, 15 (1959). I think it fair to say that
the present Supreme Court would readily
agree. As the majority observed in the
recent Casey case, supra note 77, at 2814:
'The Court must take care to speak and act
in ways that allow people to accept its
decisions on the terms the Court claims for
them, as grounded truly in principle, not as
compromises with social and political
pressures having, as such, no bearing on
the principled choices that the Court is
obliged to make.'
79 See Sedler, supra note 12, at 24- (Emphasis
added.)
So See text at note 66 supra and accompanying
footnote. Although I suspect that nowadays
almost everyone would agree that there is a
right or liberty to terminate either futile or
excessively burdensome 'medical treatment,'
sometimes the distinction between this
right and the right to commit suicide (or to
seek assistance in order to achieve this end)

255

becomes exceedingly thin. By overlooking
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the feeding tube that was to keep her alive
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elsewhere, Kamisar, The Real Reason Dr
Kevorkian was Acquitted, Legal Times,
May 30, 1994, at 27, if I had been on the
jury I could not have honestly said that
the prosecution had established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime occurred
in Wayne County.
Moreover, other jurors seemed genuinely confused about the distinction between Kevorkian's motive or ulterior
purpose (to relieve Hyde of his suffering)
and his intent or immediate purpose (to
bring about Hyde's death). Unfortunately,
the trial judge failed to dispel the confusion.
He might have done so, for example, by
telling the jury something Lord Goff once
said: 'If I kill you for your money, my
intention is to kill you but my motive is to
lay my hands on your money. So also, ifl
kill you from the motive of compassion
(so-called mercy killing) I nevertheless
intend to kill you .. .' Robert Goff, The
Mental Element in the Crime of Murder,
104 L.Q. Rev. 30, 42 (1988). But the trial
judge did not attempt to differentiate
intention from motive.
The need to do so was heightened, I
believe, by the language of Michigan's
anti-assisted suicide law. The legislature
wanted to convey the message, as Michigan
State University bioethicist Howard Brody
expressed it, Legislative Ban on Assisted
Suicide: Impact on Michigan's Medical
Practice, 92 Mich. Med. 32, 33 (1993},
that 'no Michigan physician should feel

reluctant to provide pain or symptom-relief
medication, even narcotics in very high
doses, so long as the intent is to make the
patient comfortable' (even if the medication increases the risk of death). Thus the
law criminalizing assisted suicide contains
an exception: '[This prohibition] does
not apply to prescribing, dispensing, or
administering medications or procedures
if the intent is to relieve pain or discomfort
and not to cause death, even if the
medication or procedure may hasten or
increase the risk of death.' (Emphasis
added.) But Kevorkian does not come
within this exception - when he supplies
a patient carbon monoxide his intent is to
cause death. The exception applies when
death is a byproduct of attempts to relieve
suffering by increasing the dose of narcotics; it does not apply when death is the
result intended - when the defendant
means to bring about death as a way to
end the patient's suffering. (To say that
the suicide assistance provided by Kevorkian, the person the legislators had uppermost in mind when they drafted and
debated the law prohibiting assisted suicide, falls under an exception to the
prohibition is to render the Ia w a nullity.)
Another word about the Michigan law:
To call what Kevorkian does (supplying a
person with a lethal dose of carbon
monoxide) 'administering medications or
[medical] procedures' is a peculiar use of
the English language. One might as well
say that putting a plastic bag over a
suffering patient's head in order to suffocate her is administering a medication or
engaging in a medical procedure. But the
trial judge shed no more light on the
meaning of the statutory language 'dispensing or administering medications or
procedures' than he did on the meaning
of the crucial language 'if the intent is to
relieve pain or discomfort and not to
cause death.' The trial judge evidently
assumed that Kevorkian's activities constituted administering medications or
medical procedures and left the jury to
struggle for itself over whether the de-
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fendant's 'intent' was to 'relieve' Hyde's
'pain or discomfort' (an exception to the
ban) or to 'cause' his death (a violation of
the law).
85oF. Supp. I454 (U.S.D.C., W.D. Wash.,
May 3, I994l· The case is on appeal.
See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
This decision, by Wayne County Circuit
Judge Richard Kaufman, is discussed at
considerable length in the text at notes
89-I07 supra.
The court made its ruling in Hobbins v.
Attorney General, 5I8 N. W. 2d 487 (Mich.
App. I994), which had been consolidated
on appeal with People v. Kevorkian. See
the discussion in p8 N.W. 2d at 492--94.
However, the court of appeals invalidated
Michigan's ban against assisted suicide
on a technical ground- by both establishing a commission to study certain issues
relating to death and dying and amending
the penal code to create the crime of
assisted suicide the law ran afoul of a
state constitutional provision that no law
shall embrace more than one object. But
seven months later the state supreme
court reversed the court of appeals on this
point. See note 12 3 infra.
Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.
2d at 492.
Numbers 9959, 99674 & 99759 (Dec. 13,
1994). The court also held that Michigan's
anti-assisted suicide ban did not violate a
state constitutional requirement that no
law may embrace more than one object. It
held, too, that even absent a statute
specifically prohibiting assisted suicide,
such conduct rna y be prosecuted as a
separate common-law offense punishable
by five years' imprisonment.
Numbers 99752 & 99758 (Dec. 13, 1994).
Hobbins and Kevorkian are summarized
and extracted in 63 US Law Week 2385,
2393--94 (January 3, 1995). Two days
after the Michigan Supreme Court handed
down these decisions, the Chief Judge of
the US District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Thomas Griesa,
also rejected that argument that there is a
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constitutional right to assisted suicide.
Quill v. Koppel/, No. 94 Civ. 5321 (TPG)
(U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y., Dec. I5, I994). The
case is summarized and extracted in 6 3
U.S.L.W. 2401, 24o6-o7 (Jan. 10, I995).
Slip op. at 29-33, 35-36, 43 (Chief Justice
Cavanagh, joined by Justices Brickley
and Griffin). In a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Justice Boyle, joined by Justice Riley,
'agree[d] with the lead opinion's result
and rationale that [the ban against assisted
suicide] is not violative of a fundamental
right protected by the Due Process Clause
of the state or federal constitution.' Slip
op. at 2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
mentioned in the extracts from Chief
Justice Cavanagh's lead opinion, is discussed in note 22 supra. See also Quill v.
Koppel/, supra, note 124, which also
concluded that plaintiffs' reliance on
Cruzan and Casey was misplaced. Quill
also rejected the argument that refusal of
medical treatment is essentially the same
thing as committing suicide with the
assistance of a physician.
The New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law, When Death Is Sought:
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
Medical Context (1994). The Task Force
included eight medical doctors {two of
whom were deans of medical schools),
two bioethicists who were not medical
doctors, four lawyers, six clergymen (one
of whom was also a law professor), the
state commissioner of health, the state
commissioner on the quality of care for
the mentally disabled and a member of
the New York Civil Liberties Union. In
addition, a nurse and three medical doctors
served as consultants to the task force.
The New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law, Life-Sustaining Treatment:
Making Decisions and Appointing a
Health Care Agent (1987).
New YorkStateTaskForceReport (1994),
supra note 126, at ix (Executive Summary).
Id. at 120.
Id.
See id. at I38-4o.
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I d. at I40.
Id.
Id. at I4o-41.
Id.
Id. at vii (Preface) 68, 7I-'75· Although
the Task Force report was published
three weeks after the decision in the
Compassion in Dying case, it was written

before Judge Rothstein issued her ruling
in that case.
I 37 I d. at 68.
138 Id. at 71.
139 ld.
I4o ld.
I41 See id. at 72, I2I, I25, I3I-33, I45, I47·

